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Quantum secure direct communication based on order rearrangement of single
photons
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School of Electronic Science and Engineering,
National University of Defense Technology,
Changsha, 410073, China
Based on the ideal of order rearrangement and block transmission of photons, we present a
quantum secure direct communication scheme using single photons. The security of the present
scheme is ensured by quantum no-cloning theory and the secret transmitting order of photons. The
present scheme is efficient in that all of the polarized photons are used to transmit the sender’s secret
message except those chosen for eavesdropping check. We also generalize this scheme to a multiparty
controlled quantum secret direct communication scheme which the sender’s secret message can only
be recovered by the receiver under the permission of all the controllers.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Quantum cryptography has been one of the most
promising applications of quantum information science.
It utilizes quantum effects to provide unconditionally se-
cure information exchange. Since the first QKD proto-
col was proposed by Benneett and Brassard in 1984 [1],
quantum key distribution (QKD) which provides uncon-
ditionally secure key exchange has progressed quickly. In
recent years, a good many of other quantum cryphtogra-
phy schemes have also been proposed and pursued, such
as quantum secret sharing (QSS)[2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7], quan-
tum secure direct communication (QSDC) [8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. QSS is the generalization
of classical secret sharing to quantum scenario and can
share both classical and quantum messages among shar-
ers. QSDC’s object is to transmit the secret message
directly without first establishing a key to encrypt them,
which is different to QKD. QSDC can be used in some
special environments which has been shown by Bostro¨em
and Deng et al.[9, 10]. Many researches have been car-
ried out in QSDC. We can divide these works into two
types, one utilizes single photons [11, 12], the other uti-
lizes entangled state [9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19].
Deng et al. proposed a QSDC scheme using batches of
single photons which serves as one-time pad [11]. Cai et
al. presented a deterministic secure direct communica-
tion scheme using single qubit in a mixed state [12]. The
QSDC scheme using entanglement state is certainly the
mainstream. Bostro¨m and Felbinger proposed a ”Ping-
Pong” QSDC protocol which is quasi-secure for secure
direct communication if perfect quantum channel is used
[9]. Cai et al. pointed out that the ”Ping-Pong” Protocol
is vulnerable to denial of service attack or joint horse at-
tack with invisible photon [20, 21]. They also presented
an improved protocol which doubled the capacity of the
”Ping-Pong” protocol [13]. Deng et al. put forward a
two-step QSDC protocol using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
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(EPR) pairs [10]. We presented a QSDC scheme using
EPR pairs and teleportation [14] and a multiparty con-
trolled QSDC scheme using Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
states [15].
In Ref. [22], Deng et al. utilize controlled order re-
arrangement encryption to realize a QKD scheme. In
their scheme, the communication parties share a control
key used to control the order rearrangement operation.
Very recently, A. D. Zhu et al. proposed a QSDC scheme
based on secret transmitting order of entangled particles
[23]. The security of their scheme is based on entangle-
ment and the secret transmitting order of particles. In
this Letters, we present a QSDC scheme using single pho-
tons based on the ideal of the order rearrangement and
qubit transmission in batches [22, 23, 24]. The initial
state of the transmitting photon is prepared randomly in
one of the four states belonging to two conjugate basis,
which is similar to the BB84 QKD protocol. The secu-
rity of the scheme is based on quantum no-cloning theory
and the secret transmitting order of single photons. All
of the single photons are used to generate secret mes-
sage except those used for eavesdropping check. It is not
necessary for the communication parties to choose a ran-
dom measuring basis for eavesdropping check. Compared
with schemes using EPR pairs, this scheme is more re-
alizable. We also generalize this scheme to a multiparty
controlled quantum secret direct communication (MC-
QSDC) scheme. In the MCQSDC scheme, the sender’s
secret message is transmitted directly to the receiver and
can only be reconstructed by the receiver with the per-
mission of all the controllers. We also discuss the security
of the two schemes, which is unconditionally secure.
Here We first describe the details of our QSDC scheme
using single photons. Suppose the sender Bob wants to
transmit his secret message directly to the receiver Alice.
(S1) Alice prepares N single photons each of which is
2randomly in one of the following states
|H〉 = |0〉,
|V 〉 = |1〉,
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉),
|−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). (1)
She then send the N photons [P1, P2, · · · , Pn], called P -
sequence to Bob.
(S2) Bob selects randomly a sufficiently large sub-
set from the P -sequence for eavesdropping check, called
checking sequence (C-sequence). The remaining pho-
tons of the P -sequence form a message sequence (M -
sequence). Bob performs randomly one of the two uni-
tary operations
I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|,
U = iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|. (2)
on each of the photons in the C-sequence. He also encode
his secret message on theM -sequence by performing one
of the unitary operations I and U , according to his secret
message. If his secret message is “0” (“1”), Bob performs
operation I (U). The operation U flips the state in both
Z-basis (|0〉,|1〉) and X-basis (|+〉,|−〉), as
U |0〉 = −|1〉, U |1〉 = |0〉,
U |+〉 = |−〉, U |−〉 = −|+〉. (3)
(S3) Bob disturbs the order of the photons in the P -
sequence and generates a rearranged photon sequence,
called P ′-sequence [P ′
1
, P ′
2
, · · · , P ′
n
]. He then sends the
P ′-sequence to Alice. The order of P ′-sequence is com-
pletely secret to others but Bob himself, which ensures
the security of the present scheme.
(S4) Alice tells Bob she has received the P ′-sequence.
After hearing from Alice, Bob announces the position
of the C-sequence and the secret rearranged order in it.
He also publishes his corresponding operations on the
photons in the C-sequence.
(S5) Alice has the initial state information and the po-
sition of each checking photons. She then performs von
Neumann measurement on each of the checking photons.
If the initial state of the checking photon is |H〉 or |V 〉
(|+〉 or |−〉), Alice performs Z-basis (X-basis) measure-
ment on it. Alice has the initial states information of
the checking photons, Bob’s operation information on the
checking photons and her measurement results on them.
She can then evaluate the error rate of the transmission
of the P -sequence. If the error rate exceeds the thresh-
old, they abort the scheme. Otherwise, they continue to
the next step.
(S6) Bob publishes the secret order of theM -sequence.
According to the initial states information of the M se-
quence, Alice performs Z-basis or X-basis measurement
on the M -sequence. She can then obtain Bob’s secret
message.
We now discuss the unconditional security of the
present scheme. The security of the scheme is based on
quantum no-cloning theory and the secret transmitting
order of the photons. Quantum no-cloning theory ensures
that an eavesdropper, Eve cannot make certain the ini-
tial states of the transmitting photons prepared by Alice,
which is similar to the BB84 QKD protocol. The differ-
ence between the BB84 QKD protocol and the present
scheme is that the communication parties perform Z-
basis or X-basis measurement randomly for preventing
eavesdropping in the former, but the order rearrange-
ment is used to prevent Eve from obtaining the sender’s
secret message in the latter. Suppose Eve intercepts the
P -sequence and resends another photon sequence pre-
pared by Eve to Bob. After Bob has performed his oper-
ations on the photon sequence, he then sends it to Alice.
Eve can also intercepts this photon sequence. However,
Eve cannot obtain Bob’s operation information because
Bob disturbs the order of the photon sequence and Eve’s
attack will be detected during the eavesdropping check.
Without the correct order of the photon sequence, Eve
can only obtain a batch of meaningless data. Obviously,
the present scheme is also safe against collective attack
due to the secret order of rearranged photon sequence.
As we described above, the present scheme is uncondi-
tionally secure.
We then generalize this QSDC scheme to a MCQSDC
scheme. Suppose the sender Bob wants to transmit his
secret message directly to the receiver Alice under the
control of the controllers Charlie, Dick,· · · , York and
Zach.
(S1′) Alice prepares a batch of N single photons ran-
domly in one of the four states |H〉, |V 〉, |+〉, |−〉 and
sends this batch of photons to Charlie.
(S2′) Charlie performs randomly one of the three uni-
tary operations I, U , H on each photon, where
H =
1√
2
(|0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|+ |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|) (4)
is a Hadamada operation. H can realize the transforma-
tion between Z-basis and X-basis,
H |0〉 = |+〉, H |1〉 = |−〉,
H |+〉 = |H〉, H |−〉 = |V 〉. (5)
He then sends the N photons to the next controller, say
Dick. Dick and the remaining controllers repeat the sim-
ilar operations as Charlie until Zach finishes his opera-
tions on the N photons. Zach then sends the N photons
to Bob.
(S3′) Similar to (S2), Bob encodes his random message
and secret message on the C-sequence and M -sequence,
respectively. He also disturbs the order of the P -sequence
and send the rearranged P -sequence to Alice.
(S4′) After hearing from Alice, Bob announces the C-
sequence and the secret order in it. He then let Alice
publish the initial states of the sampling photons. To
prevent Alice’s intercept-resend attack, for each of the
3sampling photons Bob selects randomly a controller to
announce his or her H operation information on the sam-
pling photon firstly and then the others do in turn. That
is to say, the controllers do not publish their I or U op-
eration information but only publish their H operation
information on the sampling photons. According to these
information, Alice can measure the sampling photons in
a correct measuring basis. She tells Bob his measurement
results. Bob chooses randomly a controller to publish his
or her I, U operation information on each of the sampling
photons firstly and then the others do one by one. Thus
Bob can determine the error rate of the transmission of
the P sequence. If he confirms there is no eavesdrop-
ping, the process is continued. Otherwise, the process is
stopped.
(S5′) Bob publishes the secret order of theM -sequence.
If the controllers permit Alice to reconstruct Bob’s se-
cret message, they tell Alice their operation information.
Thus Alice can obtain Bob’s secret message under the
permission of the controllers Charlie, · · · , York, Zach.
The H operation performed by the controllers is very
important for the security of the scheme. The nice fea-
ture of the H operation which can realize the transforma-
tion between Z-basis and X-basis can prevent Eve or a
dishonest controller from obtaining the control informa-
tion of the controllers. If the controllers only performs
I or iσy operations on the P sequence, Eve or a dishon-
est Alice can obtain the control information by taking
intercept-resend attack. Eve intercepts the P -sequence
and resends a fake photon sequence to the controller. Af-
ter the controller has performed his or her operations on
the P -sequence and sent it to the next controller, Eve can
also intercept the photon sequence and then obtain the
controller’s information by measuring it. Bob firstly let
the controllers publish theirH operation information and
then Alice can choose a correct measuring basis. Only
after Alice has published her measurement results could
the controllers announce their I, U operation informa-
tion. It can prevent Alice from obtaining Bob’s secret
message without the control of the controllers. If the con-
trollers publish all of their operation information firstly,
Alice can break the control of the controllers by taking
intercept-resend attack. In this attack, she sends the P -
sequence to Bob directly and a fake photon sequence to
Charlie. Certainly, she should intercept the photon se-
quence which Zach sends to Bob. With their controller’s
operation information, during the eavesdropping check
Alice can successfully deceive Bob and then obtain his
secret message without the permission of the controllers.
Bob chooses randomly a controller to publish his or her
operation information on each of the sampling photons
firstly and then the others do one by one during the eaves-
dropping check. It ensures each controller can really act
as a controller. Suppose Bob let Charlie, Dick, · · · , York
publish their operation information firstly and Zach do
finally. In other words, Bob does not select randomly a
controller to publish his or her information. Alice can
then collaborate with Zach to acquire Bob’s secret mes-
sage without the control of other controllers. Alice sends
the P -sequence to Zach directly and a fake sequence to
Charlie. Zach resends the P -sequence to Bob without
doing any operation. Zach can know what operation in-
formation he should publish according to the operation
information of the controllers Charlie, Dick, · · · , York.
The attack of Alice and Zach will not be detected by
Bob during the eavesdropping check. On the basis of the
above analysis, the present MCQSDC scheme is secure.
So far we have presented a QSDC scheme and a MC-
QSDC scheme using single photons. Quantum no-cloning
theory and the secret transmitting order of photons en-
sure the security of these schemes. In these schemes,
all of the polarized photons are used to transmit the
sender’s secret message directly to the receiver except
those chosen for checking eavesdropping. During the
process of the scheme, it only needs once eavesdropping
check. Compared with the schemes using entangled state,
these schemes are practical within the present technology.
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